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The Third Russian Duma: Cleavages and Coalitions
Using the roll-call data, this study examines the voting behavior of the Russian Duma in passing economic legislation between 1999 and 2003. Specifically, we addressed two questions: i) what main factors systematically divided the Parliament in voting over the economy; and ii) what coalitions did the parliamentarians build to get around those cleavages? Our results contradict the conventional wisdom that says the main source of economic voting cleavages within the State Duma comes from a traditional ideological divide, which separates the deputies along a left-right continuum. Instead, we find that the most common type of disagreement had to do with the attitude of the deputies toward Russia’s executive power and its economic reforms, while the second most typical division had to do with the deputies’ positions toward the role of the state in the economy. In general, the pro-presidential forces were most successful in building coalitions and passing the government’s proposals into laws. This is because their position overlapped, on the one hand, with most liberals along the first cleavage dimension (support of the executive’s economic legislation), and with most conservatives along the second cleavage dimension (strengthening the state’s role in the economy).
Кунов Андрей, Шакин Дмитрий
APSA Working Paper 01.09.2005

 

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